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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CAMERON LEE WATSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 48350-2020 & 48351-2020
Ada County Case Nos.
CR01-17-31677 & CR01-19-52078

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ISSUES
I.

Has Cameron Lee Watson failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

II.

Has Watson failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September 2017, the state charged Watson with three counts of burglary, one count of
grand theft, two counts of petit theft, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (48350
R., pp.23-25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Watson pled guilty to one count of burglary. (48350
1

R., pp.29, 37-38.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(48350 R., pp.41-44.)

Following the period of retained

jurisdiction, the court suspended Watson’s sentence and placed her on probation for seven years.
(48350 R., pp.46-50.)
In January 2020, while Watson was still on probation in her 2017 case, the state charged
her with two counts of grand theft, two counts of burglary, and one count of petit theft. (48351
R., pp.24-26.) Watson pled guilty to one count of grand theft pursuant to a plea agreement. (43851
R., pp.41-42; Aug., pp.1-2; 5/14/20 Tr., p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.25.) As part of a global resolution, the
state dismissed the remaining charges as well as Ada County Case No. CR01-20-8418. (Aug., p.1;
43851 R., p.45. 1)
The state filed a motion for probation violation in the 2017 burglary case. (48350 R.,
pp.90-94.) The state alleged that Watson violated the terms and conditions of her probation by –
among other things – committing new crimes, using various controlled substances, failing to
complete substance abuse treatment, failing to complete the Moral Recognition Therapy program,
failing to complete the Cognitive Self Change program, failing to report to her supervising officer,
failing to submit to random drug tests, and absconding supervision. (Id.) Watson admitted to
violating her probation by using heroin while pregnant, using methamphetamine, failing to
complete the Moral Recognition Therapy program, failing to complete the Cognitive Self Change
program, and committing the new crime of grand theft. (48350 R., pp.90-94, 100.)
The district court held a consolidated probation violation disposition and sentencing
hearing. (43850 R., pp.102-04.) In the 2017 case, the court revoked Watson’s probation and
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In Ada County Case No. CR01-20-8418, Watson was charged with two counts of burglary and
four counts of grand theft. (See PSI, p.122.)
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executed the previously suspended sentence. (48350 R., pp.105-06.) In the 2020 case, the court
imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two and one-half years fixed. (48351 R., pp.4546.) Watson timely appealed. (48350 R., pp.108-09; 48351 R., pp.52-53.)
ARGUMENT
I.
Watson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In the 2020 grand theft case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years,

with two and one-half years fixed. (48351 R., pp.45-46.) On appeal, Watson argues the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)
According to Watson, proper consideration of mitigating factors supported a more lenient sentence
of eight years, with two years fixed. (Id.) Watson’s argument is unavailing. The court imposed
a reasonable sentence.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citations omitted). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The Court “reviews
an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the trial court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
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(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d
1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
“A sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be

considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)). Furthermore,
where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that
it is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citation omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must
show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. (citation omitted). To
establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds
could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).
A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted). The district court has
the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the
sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998)
(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the
trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
4

Watson concedes that her sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. (Appellant’s
brief, p.4.) She was charged with grand theft under I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b)(3), which
is punishable by a minimum term of confinement of one year and a maximum term of confinement
of not more than fourteen years. I.C. § 18-2408. The district court imposed a unified sentence of
eight years, with two and one-half years fixed. (48351 R., pp.45-46.) Because the sentence
imposed fits squarely within the statutory limits, Watson “must show that the sentence, in light of
the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). She cannot do so.
The district court appropriately crafted a sentence to balance the primary goal of protecting
society while also addressing the need for deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Watson has
an undeniable proclivity for victimizing individuals in the community. In this case, Watson
entered several unlocked vehicles and took various items including debit/credit cards, a Medicaid
card, blank personal checks, knives, and a backpack full of military gear. (PSI, pp.432-44.) In
pleading guilty, Watson admitted that she took a debit card from inside an unlocked car with the
intent to deprive the owner of it and then used the card knowing that it did not belong to her.
(5/14/20 Tr., p.9, L.11 – p.10, L.17; see PSI, p.431.) Her conduct in this case was by no means an
isolated incident. Watson’s criminal history illustrates that she has repeatedly victimized members
of the community by committing serious thefts. According to the prosecutor, Watson has eleven
felony convictions (8/17/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.16-20), including numerous burglary and grand theft
convictions (48530 R., pp.105-06; PSI, pp.96-97, 120-24; Aug., p.1). Additionally, the PSI
indicates that she is a moderate risk to reoffend. (PSI, p.143.) That assessment was well-founded
as she had more than a dozen burglary and grand theft charges pending against her prior to
sentencing in the 2020 case. (PSI, pp.120-22.)
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Moreover, Watson makes no bones about her drug addiction. She self-reported that despite
being raised in a loving and supportive family where nobody had ever done drugs, she began
experimenting with drugs at the age of

(PSI, pp.98-99, 102.) She admitted that she had

used a plethora of illegal substances throughout her life. (PSI, pp.102, 146.) She admitted that
she uses marijuana one to two times weekly, methamphetamine and heroin multiple times daily,
and once used designer stimulants. (Id.) She was diagnosed with stimulant use disorder, opioid
use disorder, and although she did not meet the criteria for substance use disorder diagnoses with
respect to other controlled substances, she reported using alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, and
hallucinogens. (PSI, pp.147-49.) Despite completing a rider, she failed to utilize the skills
introduced to her through that program and upon her release onto probation she failed to
successfully complete treatment, used heroin during the last four months of her pregnancy, was
terminated from drug court in Canyon County, (PSI, pp.122-24.)
The district court considered this information in fashioning Watson’s sentence. (8/17/20
Tr., p.14, Ls.2-10.) The court exercised reason in concluding that Watson’s conduct merited a
penalty (id.), and that she needed a “fair amount of time … out of the community” (8/17/20 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.11-17). The imposition of a two and one-half years fixed prison term was reasonable as
it protected society from being further victimized by Watson while allowing her to be sober for an
extended period of time and “gain some level of control” over her addictions. (Id.) Moreover, the
sentence allows for the possibility of parole in two and one-half years (just six months after the
fixed term Watson requested), so that Watson will be able to seek treatment and rehabilitation
while still under the supervision of the Commission of Pardons and Parole. Because the court
properly considered the relevant sentencing factors in imposing Watson’s sentence, it did not abuse
its sentencing discretion.
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Watson argues that the fixed portion of her sentence is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) She specifically contends that she merited a two-year
fixed term of confinement given mitigating factors such as her age, substance abuse issues, and
acceptance of responsibility and remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) Her argument is unavailing.
The court adequately considered her substance abuse issues, her age, and her expressions of
remorse when it imposed her sentence. (See 8/17/20 Tr., p.9, L.16 – p.10, L.2; p.11, Ls.8-19; p.12,
L.15 – p.13, L.22.) The court rejected her words of contrition and informed her that she was “at
the point where talk isn’t enough.” (8/17/20 Tr., p.12, L.15 – p.14, L.3.) Because Watson had
“committed crimes over and over” and squandered every opportunity to be rehabilitated in the
community, the court sensibly concluded that a two-and-a-half-year term of incarceration was
appropriate to meet the objectives of sentencing. (8/17/20 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-21.) Watson has failed
to show that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the
objectives of sentencing. Accordingly, she has failed to show that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.
II.
Watson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked
Her Probation and Executed The Underlying Sentence
A.

Introduction
The district court revoked Watson’s probation and executed the previously suspended

sentence. (48350 R., pp.105-06.) On appeal, Watson concedes that the invited error doctrine
precludes her from challenging the revocation of her probation and execution of her sentence.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) “Mindful of the invited error doctrine,” she nevertheless “maintains
the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) Her
argument is meritless. Even if the invited error doctrine does not preclude her argument, the record
7

reveals that the district court had an adequate basis to revoke her probation and impose the
underlying sentence.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The trial court’s decision to revoke probation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion.” State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312, 1 P.3d 809, 813 (Ct. App. 2000)
(citations omitted). The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Smith, 168
Idaho at ___, 483 P.3d at 1019 (internal quotation omitted).
In determining whether the trial court properly revoked probation, the Court “examines all
the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and
the revocation of probation.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App.
1998). The “focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke
probation.” State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Watson’s Probation
As a preliminary matter, Watson cannot challenge the district court’s decision to revoke

her probation and impose the underlying sentence because she invited any such error. 2 The
doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own

2

The state does not concede that the district court erred when it revoked Watson’s probation and
executed the underlying sentence.
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conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d
654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605,
961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998). In short, invited errors are not reversible. State v. Gittins,
129 Idaho 54, 58, 921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 1996). Here, Watson requested that the court revoke
her probation and execute her sentence. (See 8/17/20 Tr., p.10, L.19 – p.13, L.23.) She concedes
this point on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) Because Watson invited the court to revoke her
probation and execute her sentence, she cannot assert that the district court abused its discretion
when it did so. The district court’s decision to revoke probation should be affirmed on this basis.
Even if Watson’s argument is addressed on the merits, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence. “The purpose of
probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and
supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society. State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho
452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769 P.2d 602, 603 (Ct.
App. 1989). “If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation
is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho
49, 50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Idaho Code § 20-222
(authorizing the revocation of probation at any time if the probationer violates any condition of
the probation).
Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing adequate
protection for society where the defendant repeatedly violates the conditions of probation and
commits new crimes. See, e.g., State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276-77, 899 P.2d 985, 986-87 (Ct.
App. 1995) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “society was at risk if
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[the probationer] remained at large” and “probation had not been successful in fostering
rehabilitation” as shown by defendant’s “commission of a new theft”); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho
324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the district court properly revoked probation
because “probation . . . was not working” and “continued probationary status would endanger the
public” where the defendant violated conditions of probation and “committed the same type of
offense” while on probation); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “this was the third violation
of probation” and the defendant “had continued to engage in counterproductive acts”).
The record shows that probation was not achieving its rehabilitative objective and was not
consistent with the protection of society. After being placed on probation, Watson failed to
complete drug court, failed to complete any substance abuse treatment, failed to complete
cognitive self-change programming, used various illegal substances, and committed a series of
new crimes leaving numerous victims in her wake. (48350 R., pp.90-94, 100.) The attempts to
rehabilitate Watson in the community failed so drastically and her dependence on illegal
substances was so pernicious that she resorted to using heroin throughout the final four months of
her pregnancy. (PSI, pp.91, 100, 120, 123.) In light of her egregious conduct, continued drug use,
and numerous other probation violations, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
revoked Watson’s probation and executed the underlying sentence. Watson has failed to show
otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of conviction.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JRP/dd

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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